The late October fall of Al Fashir marked the consolidation of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) dominance in southwest Sudan, splitting security control over the country and setting the RSF up to rule Darfur as a parallel government, Neo Tsotetsi argues.
On 26 October, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group captured Al Fashir in North Darfur State, the last regional capital city in Darfur under Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) control. Thousands have since been killed and tens of thousands displaced amid reports of widespread violence including summary executions and sexual violence, adding to the war’s estimated 150,000 death toll since it began in 2023. With the RSF now in control of the entire Darfur region and SAF in control of most of eastern Sudan, both parties will face significantly more difficulty attempting to expand their zones of control, elevating potential for the RSF and SAF to entrench and rule as parallel authorities.
The fall of Al Fashir consolidated RSF control over southwestern Sudan, likely signalling the emergence of a stalemate in the conflict. The regional capital had remained the sole holdout under SAF control following the RSF’s 2023 capture of four other regional capitals in Darfur, rendering Al Fashir surrounded by the time the RSF launched their 18-month siege. Now dislodged from the region, Sudan’s central government has effectively lost control over the southwest and will likely struggle to make inroads to reclaim it, particularly as it operates from over 1,200 kilometres away in Port Sudan. The RSF would similarly struggle to capture or hold SAF territory as their supply lines remain anchored to the western borders, a limitation which led to their losing control over several eastern territories in early 2024. Additionally, the RSF and SAF have relatively matched military capabilities and continue to rely heavily on international partners to maintain them, significantly restraining what they can accomplish on the ground. While hostilities will continue to be focussed on the Kordofan Region and the city of El Obeid, the kinds of military victories which would meaningfully change this territorial split would require a clear capability advantage neither party currently has.
This reality will fracture the security environment and, amid little room for compromise or cooperation between the opposing parties, likely lead to a situation in which Sudan is increasingly ruled as two de facto territories. The relationship between SAF and the RSF has been marked by deep mistrust and acrimony since before hostilities broke out, despite their earlier history of cooperation in the 2019 and 2021 coups. This dynamic has driven the repeated violations and collapses of previous ceasefires, often over fears that one side will use such a period to gain an advantage over the other. A longer cessation of hostilities is also unlikely due to the parties’ strict refusal to negotiate unless their mutually exclusive conditions are met: the RSF refuses to engage unless it is treated as an independent paramilitary force and SAF has demanded that the RSF accepts SAF authority. The incompatibility of these demands effectively precludes the possibility of a peaceful solution. Thus, with the parties relatively matched militarily, regional entrenchment and parallel governance are poised to become the new status quo. The RSF has already demonstrated its intent to entrench and rule, having sworn in its “Government of Peace and Unity” in August and designated the recently captured Al Fashir as its headquarters.
Whereas elsewhere, international intervention has proven essential to resolving civil wars when there is little domestic will to do so, the confluence of geopolitical interests in the Sudanese conflict makes this intervention unlikely. Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) have issued repeated calls for action and rejected the RSF’s parallel government. However, neither organisation has been forthcoming with peacekeeping forces or exerted notable pressure to compel the parties to reach a peace agreement or cease hostilities. This contrasts sharply with the active involvement of the several foreign parties who have supported the adversaries and, for those supporting the RSF, are expected to engage with or possibly legitimise their rival government. With the extent of external involvement in the conflict, especially from countries close to Sudan, the potential for regional geopolitical tensions to entrench the division is strong, further dissuading future intervention.
In the long term, the stability of the emerging partition will depend heavily on whether the RSF and SAF can continue generating enough revenue to fund their activities. With much of Sudan still unindustrialised and devastated by the war, the distribution of natural resources between the zones of control is essential to both parties' stability. While both continue to be affected by several sanctions due to reported war crimes, SAF's status as a de jure authority and control over most of Sudan’s resources – gold, arable land and the Nile River alongside access to oil and the Red Sea – put it in a privileged position in this regard. However, the close relationship between the RSF and the United Arab Emirates – as well as the significant gold reserves under RSF control – will likely continue to sustain the group despite its relative lack of natural resources. In the meantime, both sides will continue to rely on force to maintain control of territory and, likely, order within them amid numerous allegations of civilian targeting and war crimes. With civilian involvement unlikely to be courted by either power, Sudan – even if divided – remains poised for a continuation of the military rule which has dominated its political landscape since independence.