Amid the losses of several key officials and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic of Iran must maintain its internal stability while fighting a war against the US and Israel. Neo Tsotetsi explores the domestic challenges to stability, and the outsized role Iran’s Revolutionary Guard will play in securing it.
On 28 February, US and Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and at least six other senior officials, as well as triggering a new war in the Middle East. This was the second time US and Israeli forces had struck Iran in recent months, with the first of these taking place in June 2025 over the course of twelve days. Roughly six months later, sparked by a currency depreciation crisis, Iranians held countrywide anti-government demonstrations which were swiftly followed by a violent crackdown in which thousands of civilians were killed and detained. While faultlines in Iran’s internal stability had long preceded the latest conflict and ensuing protests, Khamenei’s dramatic killing did not prove to be the tipping point for regime collapse, instead being followed by what Iranian officials describe as an existential war of survival. Now engaged in open hostilities against the US, Israel, and their allies in the Gulf, Iran must navigate widespread internal opposition, economic grievances and the loss of dozens of experienced senior officials as it seeks survival.
The design of Iran’s state institutions is directly aimed at eroding the efficacy of a decapitation; through employing a complex network of institutions and power bases, the regime is able to ensure it can survive a major loss while restraining the threat any one official can pose. This decentralisation has also facilitated a sprawling security presence, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other security forces maintaining semi-autonomous units in every region of the country. This prevents the loss of any one city or official from spelling the end of the regime: if senior leadership cannot command the armed forces, security forces are to employ a “mosaic doctrine” to decentralise command ; and, if key officials are killed, the regime has a list of three to seven successors to take their place. This decentralisation also facilitates a dense network of surveillance, civilian repression and coercive control. Beyond the presence of an intelligence agency office in every region, the omnipresence of the Basij – a paramilitary volunteer militia which takes a leading role in quashing internal opposition – makes the public, or otherwise observable, expression of dissent physically dangerous. The Basij were first on the scene during the latest protests, joining with auxiliary forces to kill thousands and arrest at least 53,500 people by mid-February, while distributing propaganda to paint them as unprovoked aggressors against security forces.
This complex design, though advantageous in war, gives rise to competing political, military and clerical power bases which must work in tandem and remain balanced enough that none can fully capture the state. Given the diverging priorities and ambitions of each, Iran requires deeply skilled and experienced political and military operators to both traverse and coalesce these bases – the sorts of characters Iran has lost in recent weeks with the killings of key figures such as Ali Larijani and Ali Khameini. While Mojtaba Khamenei’s swearing-in as Supreme Leader following his father’s death demonstrates of the resilience of Iran’s governance structures – particularly as it took place within two weeks under wartime conditions – it lays bare how succession will not solve the losses of key personnel. With Iran’s core collaborative forces now weakened, the power imbalance and the large extent to which it favours the IRGC is evident, extending the organisation’s control over the state now that the bulwarks have been weakened.
The IRGC has the explicit authority to protect the achievements of the 1979 revolution that gave rise to the Islamic Republic from both internal and external threats. One of the major sources of justification of Iran’s hardliners is a narrative of martyrdom and threat from the US and Israel, the sort which requires they remain prepared for and undertake an existential war, sustaining a regime-wide focus on military strength and resilience. Given the power the IRGC wields in Iran, Mojtaba’s ascension further tips the power imbalance in the corps’ favour, capitalising on the new Supreme Leader’s decades-long relationship with the IRGC – and relative lack of clerical and political experience outside of it – to erode potential for any other body to restrain or supplant the Revolutionary Guards and their vision for ensuring regime survival.
The immediate fate of the country will likely remain out of the hands of ordinary Iranians. The most recent wave of unrest indicates that, should such demonstrations emerge, they will likely do so months after the security environment stabilises, and may find less support among those for whom the memory of the January crackdown remains too fresh. Notwithstanding, the economic grievances which drove earlier anti-government demonstrations have persisted unaddressed – with inflation having climbed to its highest levels in the regime’s history while Iran’s Rial continues to trade at over 1.3 million IRR to one US Dollar – and high levels of discontent can be expected. The regime is unlikely to part with any power it does not need to, and precedent suggests it will likely employ the same tactics it did in January, if not intensify them, to deter any new unrest. The Basij have also maintained their crackdown since late December, recently escalating threats to the population amid the US’ and former Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi’s calls to protest despite the ongoing conflict. However, amid growing scepticism around the efficacy of foreign intervention, there is potential for citizens’ grievances with the effects of war, and fears over a crackdown, to suppress opposition in the near term. Looking further ahead, though, Iran’s state – and the IRGC which directs it – will continue to regard its people as potential adversaries to be propagandised, restrained and deterred, a dynamic likely to become entrenched as hardliners gather the political and security power to wage their existential war.