As the US administration intensifies its security strategy in the Western hemisphere, and local frustrations grow among populations contending with criminality and violence, Latin American governments face pressure to stem drug trafficking and organised crime. With some states turning to a more heavy-handed approach, Neil Mugabe considers the challenges for the security situation in the region.
Under the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), the US administration of President Donald Trump has sought to combat dynamics identified in the NSS as core threats to US national security. In the Western hemisphere, this has focused on efforts to “control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on land and sea” to facilitate “tolerable stability” in the region, and prevent cross-border spillover into the US. The approach has seen cooperation with some Latin American governments to conduct joint counter-narcotics raids and airstrikes, and the authorisation of direct US military actions, most visible in an expanded US Coast Guard and Navy presence in the Caribbean, and the January 2026 operation in Venezuela to capture former President Nicolás Maduro. The US State and Treasury departments have also imposed sanctions and terrorism designations against several criminal groups and leaders.
However, headline successes adopted by governments in response to local and US calls for tangible security improvements – large drug seizures, high-profile criminal captures and extraditions, and publicised military operations – may challenge longer-term improvements in the regional security environment. Rather, precedent indicates high levels of resilience among armed groups, especially where they remain deeply embedded in the economic and security landscape.
In response to rising violence and US policies, some governments have stepped up more visible security operations. In 2026, Latin American governments like Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and Ecuador have turned towards varying degrees of ’mano duro’ (iron fist) policies, leaning on substantial military involvement to tackle organised crime. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has increased leadership capture and extradition operations with US intelligence support. Meanwhile, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, facing escalating gang violence, has welcomed US involvement; in March 2026, Ecuador and the US launched a joint military operation and airstrikes to disrupt trafficking activity at the Colombia–Ecuador border.
However, states’ overreliance on these tactics could drive motivate more frequent and heavy-handed security operations, driving further violence in the coming months as armed groups splinter or retaliate. In Ecuador, for example, splintering groups have been a key driver of violence, and while Noboa’s proclaimed ‘state of internal armed conflict’ saw brief improvements under several military deployments, homicide rates surged in 2025 as rivalries intensified and security forces struggled to maintain control following crackdowns. Mexico’s powerful Sinaloa cartel has similarly seen ongoing fighting among splinter factions since the capture of its leader in July 2024, driving violence across Sinaloa State. Meanwhile, despite the February 2026 killing of Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación’s (CJNG) leader ‘El Mencho,’ the CJNG also remains intact and responsible for substantial violence in states like Jalisco, Nayarit, Veracruz, and Guanajuato. Retaliatory arson attacks and violent roadblocks across several states following El Mencho’s capture highlights potential for security operations against cartels to trigger bouts of violence. Colombia’s Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) has also demonstrated opposition to increased military operations and airstrikes targeting the group, and against US threats of military action, staging violent armed blockades across highways and communities in several parts of the country in December 2025.
In many cases, groups have shown resilience by simply adapting their toolkit and tactics in response to security crackdowns. Ecuador’s Los Lobos and Los Choneros groups have diversified into other areas like illegal gold mining, and expanded extortion and kidnapping. Armed groups like the ELN in Colombia have deepened territorial control over municipalities to increase recruitment, bolster ranks, and secure revenue through illicit activities, and regularly impose mobility restrictions and curfews to dissuade airstrikes in confined areas that could cause civilian casualties.
In Mexico, cartels have adjusted their extortion tactics in response to the US Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) designations and Treasury sanctions through embedding themselves further into legitimate economic sectors like mining, construction and logistics. Rather than engaging in direct threats and intimidation, cartels establish front companies to launder proceeds and maintain indirect control over companies in their territory.
Cuba remains in a deep economic crisis as tensions with the US administration worsen amid a US-imposed energy blockade, which has sharply curtailed oil imports. Facing severe fuel shortage, rolling blackouts, and electricity grid failures, the government has rationed food and imposed public service cuts. The repressive regime has also contended with small but persistent protests in Havana. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated that Cuba poses a "national security threat," and it is possible that further external pressure on the regime could galvanise local anti-government sentiment and drive continued unrest, challenging the security environment further.
A combination of top-down US pressure on incumbent governments and bottom-up voter frustrations over insecurity and violence could continue to narrow policy choices and nudge leaders towards more hardline security postures. In the coming months, this could impact areas subject to intensified strikes or operations against gangs, driving potential for safety risks and commercial disruptions at critical infrastructure supporting trafficking activities, like land borders and ports.
Ultimately, these countries face varied and complex challenges, and there is little evidence that a ‘mano duro’ approach alone can achieve sustained improvements in the security environment. Several structural challenges remain key contributors to cycles of violence, gang recruitment and impunity; significant efforts will be required to address these issues, including institution-building to deter corruption, strengthening governance to prevent community infiltration by criminal actors, and developing socio-economic resilience to stabilise the social, economic and security environment in the longer-term.