The war in Iran has plunged the Middle East into a period of instability that is likely to have ripple effects beyond the threat of direct airstrikes. Richard Gardiner considers where seemingly intractable tensions between key actors has intensified existing threats of conflict, instability and extremism, within the region and on a global scale.
Iran’s targeting of civilian and commercial sites in Gulf states and partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz in response to Israel and the US’s airstrikes has signalled a marked shift in strategy compared to its more measured reaction during the 12‑day war against Israel and the US in 2025. Already, the conflict has demonstrated Iran’s ability to make any military campaign against it politically and economically costly. But beyond the threat of airstrikes and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has the ability to leverage asymmetric capabilities to pressure adversaries in the region and further afield. Meanwhile, the conflict has also resulted in wider potential for instability as tensions among other stakeholders in the region deepen.
Beyond the threat of airstrikes and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has the ability to leverage asymmetric capabilities to pressure adversaries in the region and further afield"
A major concern among regional authorities and commercial shipping operators has centred on the potential for Iran-aligned proxy groups in Yemen and Lebanon to further destabilise the wider security environment in support of their backer.
On Israel’s northern border, the Lebanon-based political and militant group, Hezbollah, fired missiles into Israel as the conflict began, and there are growing indications that the group’s strikes are being coordinated with Iran to test Israeli air defences. Israel has taken the opportunity to further its own strategic objectives, launching what it anticipates will be a “prolonged” air campaign and ground operations inside Lebanon to target Hezbollah and its capabilities. This has included airstrikes in Beirut, and mass internal displacement in the south, with over 1,000 deaths recorded in March 2026. These developments have worsened the humanitarian situation and compounded damage to infrastructure that the government had struggled to address even before the latest hostilities began.
Further south, the Houthis remain a wildcard. While their initial reaction was limited to threats claiming that they would “pull the trigger,” the group entered the fray in late-March, launching missile salvos against Israel. While Houthis also have significant capabilities to target commercial traffic in the Red Sea and the Bab Al Mandab Strait, they are likely cautious about targeting maritime activity; such a move risks a more substantial retaliation from countries who maintain active naval forces and shipping interests in the area, and could draw Houthis into a costly conflict that will further strain its degraded capabilities from previous US and Israeli airstrikes. Nevertheless, the option remains on the table, and could see the emergence of a second maritime chokepoint alongside the Strait of Hormuz.
President Donald Trump held calls with senior Iraqi Kurdish leaders early in the conflict, prompting speculation that the US would support a possible Kurdish ground offensive into western Iran. Subsequent US‑Israeli strikes have degraded some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and border‑security positions in north‑western Iran, which could help shape conditions for Kurdish forces. However, there remains significant uncertainty over whether such an operation will materialise; key leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have been careful not to be pulled into the conflict, and Kurdish parties from Iran will require unprecedented levels of collaboration and cooperation to manage such an operation.
Iran has signalled that any support for its adversaries could carry domestic risks in countries beyond the Middle East. While successful direct strikes in the US and Europe are unlikely, the potential for asymmetric operations such as cyberattacks have placed authorities, technology and data firms, and financial institutions on high alert, as pro-Iranian groups have already ramped up cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in the Middle East. Iran‑linked actors have previously targeted Western government agencies and companies, particularly in the US, in retaliation for the US’s perceived role in regional conflicts, and a recent attack by the Iranian‑linked Handala group – which breached a US medical company and wiped data from more than 200,000 servers and devices in March 2026 – underscores the elevated threat environment.
Iran also has a track record of using intermediaries to recruit criminal groups in Western countries to carry out low‑level sabotage, arson operations, and shootings. Since the start of the current conflict, security services in Europe and North America have increasingly suspected Iranian involvement in a spike of incidents targeting Jewish institutions and US diplomatic missions. Law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies have also warned of heightened extremist threats driven by self-radicalised lone‑actors sympathetic to Iran.
Iran has indicated preparedness for a protracted confrontation, and its conventional military disadvantages will likely prompt the regime to draw on the full range of tools at its disposal to impose costs on its adversaries, driving sustained risks wherever it is able to leverage regime proxies to disrupt maritime trade, economic activity, civilian life or military capabilities. Even as reports circulate of back‑channel efforts to broker an end to the fighting, any negotiated agreement is likely to be fragile, with mutual distrust sustaining tensions and the potential for sporadic hostilities. In this context, the longer-term potential for targeted grey-zone tactics like cyberattacks, sabotage and the use of proxy groups remains high. Meanwhile, the indirect consequences of the conflict, including renewed instability in Lebanon and a growing threat of extremist violence in western countries, suggests that the broader fallout of the war could linger even in the event of a deescalation.