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WORLD NEWS IN BRIEF

1 India Civil unrest

On 2 May, tribal and other groups rioted across Manipur State, prompted by the majority-Hindu Meitei community's demand for 'Scheduled Tribe' status. This status would grant the Meitei tribe preferential access to government jobs, education and property ownership. More than 50,000 people took part in violent protests, in which at least 62 people were killed, hundreds were injured and thousands were evacuated from the region. More than 1,700 buildings were destroyed, while 35,000 people were displaced. By 7 May, the army had mostly regained control, but tensions remain elevated amid a strong security presence throughout the region. Manipur has grappled with sporadic bouts of violent unrest linked to tribal disputes since its incorporation into the Indian state in 1949, and further protests are likely while grievances around inequality remain unresolved.

2 South Korea Civil unrest

Between 3 and 14 May, thousands of doctors and healthcare workers staged countrywide strikes to denounce Parliament's 28 April vote in favour of the Nurses Act, aimed at improving working conditions and wages for nurses. Doctors and nursing assistants have argued that the Act threatens job security, and strikes eventually prompted President Yoon Suk Yeol to veto the legislation on 16 May. However, this veto subsequently prompted unionised nurses who favour the Act to strike on 19 May. Around 22,000 demonstrators attended a related protest at the Sejong-daero Intersection in Gwanghwamun in Seoul. The strikes and related unrest have not significantly disrupted healthcare services, as workers have mostly used paid leave to stage the strikes and major hospitals have continued operations as normal. However, further protests are possible while the government deliberates on how to proceed with the legislation.

3 Syria Terrorism

On 30 April, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkish forces had killed Abu Hussein Al Qurashi, the current leader of Islamic State (IS), during a counter-terrorism operation in Jindires in the Aleppo Governorate. The clashes reportedly took place at an abandoned farm, and were followed by an explosion at the premises, although details of the incident are limited. Al Qurashi is the third IS leader to be eliminated in counter-terrorist operations since February 2022, following the deaths of Abu Ibrahim Al Hashimi Al Qurashi and Abu Al Hassan Al Hashemi Al Qurashi. The death of three leaders in rapid succession could disrupt organisational strategies in the short term, although it remains unclear if this will translate into a longer-term deterioration in the group's capabilities over the coming months.

4 Argentina Civil unrest

On 15 May, hundreds of unionised metro workers affiliated with the Asociación Gremial de Trabajadores del Subterráneo y Premetro (AGTSyP) staged a one-day strike outside the offices of subway operator, Subterráneos de Buenos Aires (Sbase), in Buenos Aires. Workers denounced alleged poor working conditions and long operating hours. AGTSyP indicated that it plans to continue with intermittent one-day strikes throughout June, including stoppages of various metro lines, until the government addresses their grievances. AGTSyP-led strikes typically remain peaceful, but prompt citywide travel disruptions.

5 Paraguay Civil unrest

On 10 May, hundreds of supporters of former presidential candidate Paraguayo Cubas demonstrated outside the Tribunal Superior de Justicia Electoral de Paraguay (TSJEP) in Asunción. Protesters alleged that the 30 April elections, in which Cubas lost to Santiago Peña, were

fraudulent. Cubas continues to encourage his supporters to challenge the election results and demand a recount. This has driven at least three cases of violent clashes between Cubas's supporters and security forces outside the TSJEP, and at least 20 protesters have been injured. Cubas has since been arrested and charged with inciting violence and disrupting public order. While unrest around the election result has subsided, protests by Cubas's supporters over his arrest and detention is likely to continue over the coming weeks.

6 US Civil unrest

On 1 May, hundreds of truck drivers affiliated with the Truckers Movement for Justice (TMJ) and the Railroad Workers United (RWU) demonstrated outside the US Department of Transportation in Washington, DC. Grievances included demands for improved working conditions, and safety for truck drivers amid increasing truck hijackings countrywide. The TMJ held a similar protest on 27 April and has committed to further demonstrations with the RWU. Protests have remained peaceful with minimal transport or commercial disruptions. However, the TMJ has indicated that they now plan to use their trucks as a part of the blockade, which may prompt more significant disruptions to logistics and associated business activities. Protests will likely persist over the coming weeks pending a resolution to truckers' grievances that satisfies the TMJ, RWU and the US Department of Transportation.

7 Senegal Civil unrest

In May, activists demonstrated in Dakar and the Casamance Region in support of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. Sonko is currently on trial over rape charges in Dakar, and was found guilty of defaming the country's tourism minister, for which he received a six-month suspended prison sentence and a USD 300,000 fine. Sonko's supporters argue that the charges are politically-motivated, and intended to block Sonko from running in the 2024 presidential elections. Demonstrations have resulted in frequent clashes with police; one officer was killed and seven protesters were injured in violent demonstrations in Zinguinchor, Casamance Region, on 15 May. Such protests will likely continue in the coming months, and could escalate during Sonko's court appearances, particularly if his supporters perceive the government to be making further attempts to curb Sonko's influence in Senegalese politics.

8 Sudan War

In May, clashes persisted between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) despite US and Saudi-led peace talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Fighting remains concentrated in Khartoum and Darfur, with at least 280 people killed in Al Junaynah, West Darfur, between 12 and 13 May. Estimates suggest that over 800 people have been killed and 3,200 people injured across the country since the conflict began in April, while nearly 260,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries. Neither side has indicated the requisite will to commit to a ceasefire, and clashes will likely continue in the coming weeks.

9 Serbia Civil unrest

On 12 and 19 May, tens of thousands of people, including opposition activists, demonstrated in Belgrade to denounce the deaths of 17 people in two separate mass shootings in Belgrade, and the nearby towns of Mladenovac and Dubona, respectively. Protesters also demanded the resignation of President Aleksandar Vučić. Despite the government launching a month-long amnesty encouraging illegal gun owners to hand in their weapons, and efforts to improve gun control legislation, protesters argue that the government has failed to address underlying issues of violence in society. The demonstrations highlight frustrations opposition factions may leverage in the coming months to mobilise supporters and stage further anti-government unrest.

10 Ukraine War

Between 1 and 19 May, Russia launched nine rounds of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine, following a weeks-long lull in such attacks since late March. On 18 May, one person was killed and two others were injured in a missile strike in Odesa, while falling debris caused fires and property damage in several districts of Kyiv. Despite the increase in Russian strikes, upgrades to Ukrainian air defence – including the recent introduction of the US Patriot systems – have significantly improved its ability to intercept Russian projectiles. On 18 May, Ukrainian authorities announced that 29 of the 30 Russian missiles and drones fired at Ukraine had been intercepted. Russia will likely continue countrywide strikes in the coming weeks as Ukraine prepares to launch its counter-offensive against Russian forces, the start date of which remains unclear. GRB



ERDOĞAN RE-ELECTED

NEW PROMISES, OLD CHALLENGES

While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party's (AKP) electoral success will likely demoralise the opposition in the short term, the president faces several critical challenges as he starts his new term, **writes Tamsin Hunt.**

As Erdoğan walked into the iconic Hagia Sofia to lead evening prayers on the eve of general elections, emulating a pre-battle ritual of Ottoman Sultans, the symbolism of the spectacle was lost on few people. Turkey's strongman leader, arguably the most powerful head of state since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was facing the toughest battle of his political career. Many commentators, polling institutions, international media houses and even the markets had their money on a tight race, in which opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu would come out slightly ahead. This quiet confidence stemmed from several factors, including a struggling economy, persistent high inflation, the recent earthquakes' devastating humanitarian impact, and Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership of the most united opposition coalition ever to challenge Erdoğan.

In defiance of these expectations, Erdoğan received 2.5 million more votes than Kılıçdaroğlu in the first round of presidential elections, won the runoff

election more comfortably with 52 percent of the vote, and the AKP and its coalition partners retained their parliamentary majority. Erdoğan's brand of populism, the AKP's powerful grassroots and patronage networks, a government crackdown on opposition politicians, and Kılıçdaroğlu's lack of political charisma, likely all played a role in defying pre-election opinion polls. The president is now poised to further expand his influence over the Turkish state, although the new term will be anything but smooth sailing.

A divided republic

Victory in what has been billed as the most important election in Turkey's modern history puts Erdoğan in an even more powerful position, while the opposition ponders what went wrong. The administration will continue to clamp down on political opponents, independent journalists, and anti-government activists, while extending its already significant influence over the judiciary and the security apparatus. The opposition



coalition – made of up parties with different and even opposing ideologies – will probably struggle to stick together in the face of government pressure over the next five years.

However, whoever replaces Kılıçdaroğlu as the new head of the opposition will take some solace from the fact that Erdoğan's popularity has waned in recent years. This is the first time that he did not win the required 50 percent for an outright victory in the first round of a general election. The tight result – despite the AKP's considerable control over the state apparatus – is a clear indication of Erdoğan facing increasing opposition. There have also been more visible signs of Erdoğan's ill health on the campaign trail. Given the AKP's political project is partly centred on his charismatic personality, should the president become incapacitated, the party may struggle to replicate its past electoral successes. These factors,



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in addition to Turkey's ongoing economic struggles and the negative impact on ordinary citizens, may ultimately re-energise the opposition and even instigate occasional anti-government protests in the near future.

Economic stagnation

Erdoğan's declining popularity is largely rooted in Turkey's economic struggles over the past few years. The fragile currency, the lira, sank to new record lows following Erdoğan's stronger-than-expected performance in the elections, reaching more than 20 lira to one US dollar on 26 May. Some traders project that the lira will lose its value by an additional 24 to 40 percent over the next six to 12 months, a depreciation that Turkey can ill afford amid high inflation (43.7 percent in April 2023). Rather than raising interest rates – a widely accepted move to control inflation – Erdoğan continues to pursue unconventional economic policies aimed at preserving popular support among the middle class. In fact, days before the 14 May election, Erdoğan increased public sector wages by 45 percent, raised pensions, reduced electricity prices, and promised to provide free natural gas for households for a year, starting in June 2023. There is no indication that Erdoğan will change his approach to macroeconomics in any meaningful way, at least in the short- to medium-term, while foreign investors continue to lose confidence in Turkey's economy.

Divisive foreign policy

Erdoğan's economic gambles at home contrast his more flexible approach to foreign policy. In recent years, he sought to improve ties with several geopolitical rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt. He also recently touted his country's "special

Will another anti-Erdoğan protest movement emerge in the near future?

Over the past two decades, large and sustained opposition protests against Erdoğan and the AKP have been rare. The most prominent campaign over the past decade was the 'Gezi Park' movement in 2013. Prompted by the authorities' forced eviction of a small demonstration from Gezi Park in Istanbul, more than three million people staged thousands of demonstrations across the country for several weeks, demanding Erdoğan's resignation. A heavy-handed response from security forces killed more than 20 people and injured at least 8,000 others. While anti-Erdoğan protests still take place occasionally, the threat of police crackdown and politically-motivated prosecution remains a major deterrent to large or widespread unrest.


relationship" with Russia, despite Turkey being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which opposed Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the onset. Turkey has cashed in on Russia's geopolitical isolation, welcoming Russian tourists with open arms and buying large quantities of Russian oil and gas, for example. This does not mean Turkey is entirely pro-Russian, as it has also sent battlefield drones to Ukraine, but Erdoğan hopes the West adopts a more "balanced" approach to Russia.

In fact, it is Erdoğan's relationship with the West that has become volatile and unpredictable, especially over the past five years. Turkey's application to join the European Union (EU) has entirely stalled since 2018, as the

country fails to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria of a guaranteed democracy, rule of law and a well-functioning economy. Western attitudes to Turkey cooled even further when Turkey decided to stand in the way of NATO enlargement, opposing Sweden's – and initially Finland's – bid to join the organisation.

Persistent tensions with the West could further damage Turkey's economic prospects. In 2018, for example, the Turkish lira plummeted after the US imposed selective sanctions and a 50 percent tariff on Turkish imported steel when Turkish authorities detained an American pastor on terrorism charges. And in 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey's weapons procurement sector after it purchased S-400 missiles from Russia, despite warnings from the US. With Erdoğan at the helm for another five years, tensions between Turkey and the West are likely to continue, as demonstrated by the president's recent accusation that the US and Europe were colluding with the opposition and Kurdish militants.

The future of history

100 years on from Atatürk's founding of the Turkish republic, Erdoğan had promised a new "Turkish century" if re-elected. Whether his legacy can match Atatürk's is up for debate, but what is certain is that the long-time leader will not change course in any meaningful way, be it in terms of clamping down on dissent or (mis)handling the economy. Nevertheless, multiple challenges lurk ahead, which will make his quest to reshape Turkey anything but predictable. 

A photograph of a busy street in Pakistan, likely in a densely populated urban area. The street is filled with people, motorcycles, and rickshaws. The buildings are multi-story and appear somewhat dilapidated, with many windows and balconies. There are many overhead power lines and utility poles. The overall atmosphere is one of a bustling, everyday scene. The text is overlaid on the left side of the image.

PAKISTAN'S CRISES CONVERGE

THE PERFECT STORM

Events following Imran Khan's recent arrest illustrate the former prime minister's popular appeal and ability to mobilise protest action. Combined with the deepening economic crisis and escalating political tensions ahead of the October elections, Pakistan faces a period of significant instability and rising levels of civil unrest, **writes Richard Gardiner.**

On 9 May, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was arrested on corruption charges. The ensuing protests by his supporters left 10 people dead and over 1,600 people arrested. Khan was subsequently released, but faces more than 100 legal cases involving allegations of corruption and terrorism, and is likely to come up against more challenges as tensions escalate between Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the military-backed ruling coalition, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). Amid political tensions, Pakistan continues to grapple with a severe economic crisis and the aftermath of the 2022 floods. As these factors combine, the country looks set for increasing uncertainty and faces a heightened threat of civil unrest ahead of the October 2023 general elections.

The Khan effect

A recent popularity poll by Gallup Pakistan revealed that 61 percent of responders view Khan favourably, compared to only 32 percent of responders viewing the PDM and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif favourably. Since being ousted in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in April 2022, Khan has used populist tactics and Pakistan's deteriorating economic situation to raise public dissent against the ruling PDM and its military backers. He has further successfully mobilised several nationwide anti-government protests with over 10,000 participants to denounce the government's attempts to prevent him from regaining political office.

Khan's undeniable popular appeal has given him the confidence to challenge the government in the upcoming general elections, and he will be eager for the nationwide protests to build momentum in the lead up to the polls. Alongside Khan's popular ascent, his supporters have been similarly emboldened to oppose government and military decisions. In May, for example, a group of pro-Khan protesters set fire to a military commander's house in Lahore in response to Khan's arrest. The rising number of protests and related violent incidents pose a threat to Pakistan's political stability. Khan has the support of large swathes of the population, as well as the ability to mobilise them. However, the PDM has the backing of the military, which has significant resources to impede Khan's ambitions of returning to power.

The military's response to the recent demonstrations is likely a precursor of what's to come. For instance, arrested protesters appeared before military courts, which have significantly less transparency than civilian ones. Military forces are further likely to limit the extent

of PTI demonstrations in the coming months by arresting supporters and party leaders, implementing curfews to restrict movement or introducing internet bans to disrupt the organisation of protests and to control the flow of information. While this may suppress protests in the short term, it also has the potential to fuel hostility towards the military and government.

POLITICAL INSIGHTS



The military's might

Despite having a democratically elected civilian government,

Pakistan's military is an influential stakeholder in national politics. Since the end of military rule in 2008, none of Pakistan's five elected prime ministers have served a full five-year term, with their leadership demise often linked to disputes with the military. The hybrid-civilian style of leadership has favoured the military's approach of indirect influence within the political sphere, which has allowed it to maintain authority from behind the scenes.



Commercial implications

The simultaneous political and economic challenges that Pakistan faces have had a significant impact on the country's commercial sector. Deepening political instability is a strong deterrent for foreign investors and has hindered much-needed domestic economic growth. For example, the threat of internet shutdowns has impacted Pakistan's IT and e-commerce industries. The shutdown in the wake of Khan's arrest cost telecom operators USD 5.4 million, and the resulting service disruptions cost the government USD 1.9 million in lost tax revenues. Additionally, the threat of further violent unrest in the coming months has the potential to cause damage to commercial property, as well as prolonged business closures.

The economy on the brink

Pakistan's worsening political situation is playing out against the backdrop of an unfolding economic crisis. There is a high likelihood of the country defaulting on its debt, which would exacerbate existing grievances and set the scene for further unrest. The cost of living has soared over the past year, with headline inflation reaching 36.4 percent in April, while food inflation reached 48.1 percent. Additionally, there has been an increase of 3 million people living in poverty since 2018. If the country fails to meet its debt obligations, including the USD 4.5 billion owed by the end of June, the economic situation will likely deteriorate further. In the context of the ongoing political crisis and the upcoming elections, this has the potential to deepen anti-government sentiment, which Khan and the PTI will aim to leverage to discredit the current administration.



The PDM has the backing of the military, which has significant resources to impede Khan's ambitions of returning to power."

Looking ahead

Khan has continuously called for general elections to take place as soon as possible, yet the government has remained adamant that voters will only go to the polls in October. The reluctance to bring the elections forward is an acknowledgement of the threat that Khan poses. However, if Khan were to be imprisoned or banned from running in the election, the government would risk playing directly into Khan's populist rhetoric and deepen the feelings of mistrust towards the PDM and the military. The recent developments point to the deep divisions within Pakistan's political landscape, and there is little sign of tensions easing in the short term. At a time when a collective effort is needed amongst stakeholders in the political and military spheres to tackle the deepening economic crisis, the opposite is happening. Pakistan faces the gloomy prospect of prolonged instability and unrest as political tensions persist, and economic challenges worsen. GRB



DISCONTENT FOR ALL SEASONS

WILL UK PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES THREATEN COMMERCIAL STABILITY?

Since June 2022, public sector workers have staged several strikes across the UK to denounce insufficient salary increases. **Jervin Naidoo** and **Erin Drake discuss** the potential for strikes to persist over the coming months and highlight implications for the broader commercial sector.

In June 2022, rail, health, education and other public sector employees began a series of strikes to demand wage increases. These strikes have continued into 2023, driven by high inflation and an ongoing cost-of-living crisis. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and the current Conservative government have been hesitant to yield to “unreasonable” wage demands, viewing the shorter-term disruptions caused by the strikes as the lesser of two evils amid persistent inflation, economic stagnation and rising interest rates. The government has, however, sought to limit the impact of these strikes through attempted talks with unions, and the recent rollout of ‘anti-strike’ legislation to enforce minimum service levels in key sectors like healthcare, emergency services, transport, and energy, enabling employers to sue unions and fire striking employees who fail to comply.

Despite mass-walkouts and associated disruptions to worker commutes, healthcare, schools, and other services, the economic repercussions of the strikes on GDP have been less drastic than anticipated, costing GBP 1.4 billion between June 2022 and April 2023 (GBP 127 million per month). Yet, while some economists believe strikes are unlikely to significantly impact overall economic stability in the coming 12 months, persistent disruptions could drive workforce challenges like recruitment and retention issues and cast further uncertainty over the Conservative Party’s political future.

A rock and a hard place

Total pay (including bonuses) and regular pay (without bonuses) in the UK increased by 5.8 and 6.7 percent respectively from January to March 2023, but real wage decline remains at the heart of worker grievances. Adjusting for inflation, this resulted in a real increase of only 3 and 2 percent respectively over this period. This has prompted calls for public sector salaries to match inflation more closely; nurses have demanded a 19 percent increase, while junior doctors

demand a 35 percent rise. Sunak’s government remains resistant to many of these demands, instead cautioning that significant wage increases will further push up inflation, which reached a 41-year high in October 2022 and has since hovered around 10 percent. Although the Central Bank expects inflation to moderate to around 5 percent by the end of 2023, cost of living pressures will continue to weigh on the population amid rising food costs following weather-related reduced harvests. These factors could sustain strike action in the coming months as Sunak attempts to persist with the current approach until the Central Bank can bring inflation down to its 2 percent target.

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Sunak’s government remains resistant to many of these demands, instead cautioning that significant wage increases will further push up inflation.”

The operational impact of strikes

Although the financial impact of the strikes has been lower than anticipated, they have driven widespread disruptions to transport and public service provision. The Office for National Statistics estimates that the UK has lost 3.5 million days since the strikes began in June 2022. Some businesses have found ways to circumvent strike-related delays, including through remote working setups, or diversified transport measures to help limit supply chain disruptions. The Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) indicates that participation in walkouts have also declined, while the government has made efforts to appease some unions with wage proposals – like the Transport Salaried

Staffs' Association, which recently cancelled a 24 May walkout following progress in talks. But, these positive steps have been limited.

Unless the cost-of-living crisis is adequately addressed, the underlying grievances driving these strikes could feed into a wider staffing crisis in the public and private sectors. Up to 52 percent of public sector employers reported difficulties in filling vacancies, with the National Health Service (NHS) – which provides healthcare to 50 million people and has experienced 63 strikes since June 2022 – short-staffed by 154,000 practitioners as staff leave to pursue better salaries in the private sector and abroad. Bristol-based commerce chamber, Business West, reports that over 80 percent of 319 surveyed firms in the South West, for example, have struggled to fill vacancies and sought to increase wages to retain workers. Three-quarters of all workers in the UK expect pay rises of around 5.6 percent in the next 12 months, which could drive further retention issues should companies fail to meet these expectations. The private sector remains better placed to offer competitive salaries and benefits, but hiring also continues to suffer from skills shortages in key sectors like health, technology, engineering, manufacturing and logistics.

Sunak out of touch?

Sunak remains positive over the prospect of decreased inflation and economic growth in the longer term, although his opponents have criticised this view, claiming it is out of touch with reality. There is also

growing concern within the Conservative Party over the impact of an anti-strike posturing and the consequences of not adequately addressing workers' concerns.

With strikes set to continue for now at least, sectors most likely to be directly affected are those with the highest numbers of union membership: healthcare, transport, education and energy. Commercial operators reliant on these sectors – particularly transport – could also face associated challenges. Meanwhile, private employers will likely face continued pressure to increase salaries, and sectors reliant on labour-intensive operations like manufacturing could experience greater challenges in retaining workers should they be unable or unwilling to meet employee demands for better pay.

Political repercussions?

Public opinion polling indicates that sentiment is sympathetic to striking workers, and opposition leader Keir Starmer has already vowed to repeal Sunak's anti-strike legislation should Labour be elected in 2025. Coupled with growing internal divisions in the Conservative Party, public frustration with Sunak is apparent and was reflected in poor performance among Conservative candidates in the May local elections. This is likely to add to the growing uncertainty regarding the Conservatives' standing in 2025 and increase the prospects for a Labour government in the near future. GR8



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