On 7 May, the Indian military carried out missile strikes on Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, claiming to have targeted the facilities of three militant groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The coordinated military action, named Operation Sindoor, involved 24 strikes on nine alleged militant targets, with Indian media outlets saying 70 militants were killed. India justified Operation Sindoor as a response to the 22 April terror attack in Pahalgam, India-administered Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians.
Pakistan claimed more than 30 civilians were killed and dozens injured in the Indian strikes. Pakistani officials also stated that India targeted the Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project near Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but the damage was not significant. Pakistan’s military claimed to have shot down five Indian fighter jets and one unmanned aerial vehicle during the Indian strikes.
As of 9 May, there continue to be artillery and small arms exchanges along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Pakistan said it shot down more than a dozen Indian drones that violated its airspace, which killed one civilian and injured four soldiers.
How are the Indian strikes different from previous cross-border attacks?
The operational scope, target selection and impact of Operation Sindoor is significantly broader than previous cross-border strikes in response to terror attacks in 2016 and 2019. In 2016 surgical strikes were limited to ground assaults on militant launch pads just across the LoC. In 2019, Indian airstrikes targeted a single militant camp in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. In contrast, the Operation Sindoor strikes penetrated up to 100 km into Pakistani territory, including Bahawalpur in Punjab Province. This makes them the most extensive Indian cross-border operation since the 1971 war. There are several reasons for the unprecedented response. The Pahalgam attack was the deadliest attack on civilians in India since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, generating considerable public pressure for a forceful retaliation. Additionally, elements within India’s security establishment argue that the deterrence achieved by the 2019 strikes has eroded over time, necessitating a more aggressive demonstration of resolve to re-establish deterrence against future attacks.
Will there be a dedicated military response from Pakistan?
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said yesterday that the downing of Indian jets was a “reply” from Pakistan, and separately, the government vowed to respond “at a time, place and manner of its choosing.” Given the very public and broad scope of the Indian strikes and the reported casualties, Pakistan will likely feel compelled to issue a dedicated military response. Failing to do so would risk signalling to India that it can conduct cross-border attacks with impunity. However, any response is unlikely to match the intensity or scale of Operation Sindoor, as Pakistan will also be keen to avoid triggering a broader escalation.
In response to India’s 2016 surgical strikes, Pakistan played down the incident and did not launch a military counterattack. By contrast, Pakistan’s military response to India’s 2019 airstrikes was direct and overt: Pakistan conducted retaliatory airstrikes across the LoC, targeting open areas to avoid casualties, and shot down an Indian MiG-21, capturing the pilot. This marked a calibrated but assertive military reply aimed at signalling deterrence while avoiding broader escalation.
Will there be full-scale conflict between India and Pakistan?
The situation remains fluid, although neither India nor Pakistan appears interested in an all-out war. In the aftermath of the 7 May strikes, the Indian government said in a statement: “Our actions have been focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted. India has demonstrated considerable restraint in selection of targets and method of execution.” While Pakistan described Operation Sindoor as an “act of war,” Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated that his country is “trying to avoid” an all-out war but must be prepared for one. Despite its tough rhetoric, the Narendra Modi-led government in India has historically exercised restraint in deploying military force, especially in confrontations with Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan is keen to avoid being drawn into a full-scale conflict that would further strain its already fragile economic situation. However, if both sides continue to exchange strikes without a clear path to de-escalation, the risk of an accident or miscalculation rises sharply. This could unintentionally spark a broader conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Will major powers be able to convince the two sides to de-escalate?
De-escalation aligns with the strategic interests of all major powers, who are likely to exert diplomatic pressure – both publicly and behind closed doors – on their respective partners to exercise restraint. The US expressed solidarity with India over the Pahalgam attack but opposes further escalation. It views both India and Pakistan as important for its South Asia strategy – India as a counterweight to China, and Pakistan as a partner in counter-terrorism. A wider conflict undermines both objectives. China also urged de-escalation, emphasising regional stability. As a close partner of Pakistan which invested USD 65 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China fears that war would jeopardise its economic interests. Both the US and China are currently engaged in talks to reduce trade tensions between them and are keen to avoid heightened geopolitical uncertainty that could derail fragile economic diplomacy. Lastly, Russia called for dialogue and calm, consistent with its neutral positioning between the two countries. Russia maintains strong defence ties with India and growing ties with Pakistan.
