In the early hours of 24 June, US President Donald Trump announced that his administration had successfully mediated a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, which was due to come into effect at 07h00 Israeli time. Israel and Iran, however, continued to exchange fire hours after the US-mediated ceasefire came into effect. In Israel, air raid sirens sounded across northern and central regions, and the military claimed to have intercepted two Iranian drones. While Iran denied breaching the ceasefire agreement, Israel nevertheless responded with a barrage of airstrikes on Tehran and northern parts of Iran. Following pressure from Trump, Israeli and Iranian attacks appear to have ceased. In this article we look at three potential scenarios to offer some guidance to organisations with an operational footprint in the region or supply chains that cross over it.
Motivations to keep the peace
Although both Iran and Israel have committed to the ceasefire, the agreement remains extremely fragile, and there is a strong potential for collapse in the coming period. However, there are significant domestic and regional incentives for all sides to preserve the agreement for at least the short term.
Iran
This latest conflict between Israel and Iran was without doubt of higher impact for both countries, and an escalation from previous periodic exchanges in 2024. However, Iran’s attacks on Israel have remained calculated towards deterrence against escalating Israeli aggression, rather than an intent to push the conflict further. Iran’s increasingly isolated position, and the significant damage done to the regime and its military and nuclear capabilities – both real and perceived – has left Iran on the backfoot. Needing now to focus on domestic regime stability, the Islamic Republic will be welcoming the US-encouraged ceasefire, which will allow the regime to assess its position and next steps, particularly around regime stability, military capability, intelligence failures, and the nuclear programme.
The US
The US remains a critical variable in the potential escalation (and de-escalation) of this the conflict. US foreign policy remains pointed towards keeping the US out of conflicts abroad. While notable for its apparent deviation from this policy, the US attacks on Iran largely sought to break the stalemate in Israeli-Iranian negotiations; forcing Iran to the negotiating table, while assisting Israel in meeting its military objectives against Iranian nuclear advancement. The strikes were targeted with precision, with minimal casualties, and were designed as a once-off strike, rather than signalling US plans to officially enter the conflict with boots on the ground.
While the Trump administration will continue to support Israel – militarily, financially and strategically – domestic pressures and perhaps Trump’s own ambitions to be viewed as a peacemaker, will motivate the administration to work towards preserving this present ceasefire and preventing repeated escalations, at least in the coming weeks and months. The successful degradation of Iran’s nuclear programme, without becoming embroiled in a war abroad, can be hailed as a substantial strategic victory for the Trump administration.
Israel
Israel agreed to the ceasefire on 24 June, and announced that its military objectives of destroying the immediate nuclear and military threat from Iran had been met. For Israel, agreeing to the ceasefire – at least as a temporary measure – will allow its military to replenish its arsenal, particularly its stocks of interceptor missiles that have reportedly run low after 12 days of intense Iranian attacks. The ceasefire will end widespread and persistent disruptions to daily life and the economy, limiting public opposition to the conflict, which the government will be sensitive to. Additionally, cooperating with President Trump in the immediate term will bode well for the bilateral relations between the two countries, with the US remaining a critical ally for Israel, and a source of substantial military and financial aid. However, there is always an underlying risk that Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, will resume hostilities as a response to domestic political pressures.
Ceasefire scenarios
While there is significant uncertainty associated with the conflict outlook, and the situation on the ground may escalate rapidly and without advanced warning, here we present three forward-looking scenarios for the trajectory of the Iran-Israel conflict over a 6-12 month horizon.
These scenarios are underpinned three key assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the Iranian regime – while under significant internal and external pressure – remains intact over the coming year, continuing to exercise central authority despite its increased fragility. Secondly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu retains his position and continues to shape Israel’s national security policy throughout the period, despite periodic political challenges at home. Lastly, we assume that the US under President Donald Trump, despite providing considerable diplomatic and military support to Israel, remains opposed to a protracted conflict in the Middle East or one that necessitates sustained US involvement.
Scenario one: Fragile ceasefire underpinned by low-level conflict (higher likelihood)
Description: The 24 June ceasefire is broadly holding but being occasionally undermined by tit-for-tat attacks, including limited airstrikes, missile strikes, and cyber operations. Israel, given its military superiority, usually initiates attacks, sometimes under the pretext of targeting Iranian nuclear activity or pre-emptively thwarting an Iranian attack on Israeli territory – similar to how the Israel-Hezbollah conflict has evolved since the November 2024 ceasefire. The scope and intensity of strikes are usually calibrated to ensure the conflict does not spiral out of control. In addition to direct attacks on each other’s territory, both sides launch sporadic covert operations, with potential implications for air travel, maritime shipping and cyber security. For example, Iran or the Houthis target vessels associated with Israel, and the latter interferes with planes suspected of supplying ballistic missile equipment and technology to Iran from countries like North Korea.
Scenario two: Full-scale escalation with US involvement (moderate likelihood)
Description: The fragile ceasefire collapses, triggering a resumption in full-scale conflict marked by extensive Israeli airstrikes across Iran, targeting military infrastructure, political leadership, and economic assets, potentially triggered by substantial Israeli and US concerns about the recovery of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme, or a political crisis in Israel. Iran retaliates with ballistic missile barrages against Israeli urban centres such as Tel Aviv and Haifa. The US, initially hesitant, joins the campaign with expanded operations – striking not only any nuclear facilities still intact but also Iranian government buildings, military bases, and critical infrastructure like power grids and ports. Sensing existential threat, the Iranian regime shifts to high-risk tactics, such as launching unannounced missile attacks on US bases and energy infrastructure in the region (including those based in Gulf countries) and attempting to block or disrupt vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
Scenario three: Regional de-escalation and a return to non-confrontational tactics (lower likelihood)
Description: A vast de-escalation in tensions between Iran and Israel is underpinned by a new nuclear deal in which Iran agrees not to produce nor acquire the enriched uranium and plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario, Iran and Israel remain adversaries, divided by longstanding ideological differences, and Israeli concerns around Iran’s sponsoring of regional militant groups. Such an agreement would also require substantial and committed buy-in, not only from the international community, but particularly from the US. Likely the only international actor with the ability to pressure Israel to walk back its direct military tactics, the US would need to be willing to impose diplomatic pressure on Israel.
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