Amid heightened geopolitical tension and rivalry, the ways in which countries compete to secure influence and strategic goals have shifted in recent years. Richard Gardiner explores how conflict dynamics are likely to unfold in 2026, and the implications these may have for commercial operators in key hotspots.
While more traditional armed conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war remain major challenges for regional security, the evolving dynamics of warfare and state-sponsored terrorism have also driven changes in the risk landscape to governments and businesses. In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment, major powers are expanding the range of tools used to pursue national security goals, strengthen economic influence, and secure strategic resources. Throughout 2025, this shift has been reflected in intensified Russian grey-zone activity in Europe, more assertive military posturing and regional security measures in areas such as the Caribbean, and increased competition over strategic resources and critical supply chains.
These dynamics illustrate how geopolitical competition is carrying wider implications for businesses operating amid conditions of continued uncertainty in 2026.
State-sponsored terrorism: Grey-zone tactics
Grey‑zone activity (hostile actions that stop short of full‑scale war) has become an increasingly prominent strategy employed by states such as Iran and Russia to pressure and destabilise rivals. Notably, amid the Russia-Ukraine war, this has included efforts to destabilise rival governments, and leverage the cyber landscape to disrupt infrastructure, elections and public trust. Suspected Russian operations have involved physical sabotage, such as explosions damaging railway lines on the Warsaw-Lublin corridor in November 2025, which Poland’s government described as an “unprecedented” act of state‑linked sabotage against a route critical for aid to Ukraine. European security services have also linked a series of parcel fires in July 2024 at logistics hubs in Germany, Poland, and the UK to a Russian military intelligence plot to place incendiary devices in air cargo. Prosecutors said the devices were likely test runs for attacks on cargo flights bound for the US and Canada. In addition, there has been constant GPS‑signal jamming targeting air traffic over the Baltic Sea, with Sweden logging 733 incidents affecting civil aviation by late August 2025, up from just 55 in 2023.
State-sponsored proxies
Russia’s security services typically coordinate these grey-zone operations but often avoid carrying them out directly, outsourcing them to criminal or proxy networks to blur responsibility and preserve plausible deniability and making it harder for European states to coordinate an effective response. These intermediaries may handle tasks such as surveillance, sabotage, logistics, finance, and online influence, sometimes mixing criminal activities with political missions so that operations look like ordinary organised crime rather than state action.
Europe
Operators and travellers in Europe face potentially escalating security concerns and commercial disruptions as Russia looks to intensify grey-zone tactics like drone incursions, airspace violations, cyberattacks, sabotage, misinformation campaigns against European NATO members.
Impact
Sporadic disruptions to air travel; critical infrastructure disruptions energy and communications grids; increased cybersecurity vulnerabilities that expose companies to operational and financial vulnerabilities.
Vulnerable sectors
- Energy and telecommunications
- logistics and manufacturing
- North Sea and Baltic aviation and shipping
Outlook
Russia has expanded its grey‑zone campaign against European NATO members over the past two years to not only deter continued military support for Ukraine, but also to weaken the alliance’s cohesion. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Russia is already in confrontation with the West, viewing NATO’s expansion and support for Kyiv as evidence of persistent hostility. Therefore, even if the conflict in Ukraine ends in 2026, grey‑zone activity in Europe is unlikely to subside. European leaders and NATO officials, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, are increasingly framing these tactics as state-sponsored terrorism, with governments warning that continued grey-zone attacks could trigger tighter sanctions on Russia and pledging to strengthen security in areas such as undersea infrastructure and air and maritime policing.
As European governments work to counter this evolving threat, companies with operations or staff in Europe increasingly need to plan for disruptions not only on land but also in key maritime and cyber domains. Hotspots to watch through 2026 include the Baltic and North seas, where critical undersea cables and energy pipelines have already suffered damage, as well as the rail and logistics routes carrying military aid across Poland and the Baltic states. Companies operating in front‑line or strongly pro‑Ukraine countries – spanning defence, transport, logistics, energy, and telecoms – are likely to face increased exposure to both direct and spillover grey‑zone activity.
National security: Shifting priorities
The Russia-Ukraine war and broader geopolitical tensions have in recent years affected a shift in major powers’ security priorities, with ripple effects for traditional alliances, defence and economic agendas, and regional security.
This dynamic has had a significant impact on Europe’s response to Russia’s ongoing aggression. In June, all European NATO members except Spain pledged to raise defence spending to five percent of GDP, up from the current two percent target. This shift has largely been driven by sustained US pressure for greater burden sharing, prompting leaders in European capitals to present higher defence outlays and capability development not only as a response to Russia, but also as a hedge against uncertainty over the future scale and reliability of Washington’s military presence in Europe.
Another key example of how shifting priorities are shaping foreign and domestic policy is the US administration’s heightened focus on drug trafficking into the US, which the White House has termed a national security crisis. Designating several organised crime groups and cartels in Latin America, such as the Cartel de los Soles, as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) has enabled a more robust use of military and counterterrorism tools to combat the threat. These priorities have resulted in a build-up of US military assets and an expanded campaign of airstrikes against suspected drug-trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. In its recently published National Security Strategy (NSS), the administration has prioritised the Western Hemisphere as a primary theatre of concern and identifies border security, migration and drug trafficking as core national security vulnerabilities, calling for “targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels,” including the use of lethal force against “narco‑terrorists” where deemed necessary. The Venezuelan government has viewed these actions as violations of its sovereignty and as a pretext for coercive pressure on Caracas, raising concerns among some Latin American observers about escalation risks and potential miscalculation – even if both the US and Venezuela intend to avoid direct confrontation.
Caribbean and Central America
A Sustained US military presence and further strikes against drug-trafficking vessels – or within target countries – could prompt instability both offshore and in the wider region.
Impact
Disruption to shipping lanes amid strike operations; and to air travel corridors should tensions lead to prolonged closure of Venezuelan airspace. Potential misidentification and targeting of commercial vessels.
Vulnerable sectors
- Commercial shipping
- Oil and gas
- Aviation
- Tourism in the Caribbean
Outlook
The designation of Latin American drug cartels as FTOs raises the stakes for companies with operations or counterparties in the region, since even unintended dealings that could be construed as providing ‘material support’ to an FTO may trigger serious legal, compliance, and reputational consequences.
Additionally, tourism‑dependent countries such as Jamaica worry that rising regional tensions could reduce visitor numbers, threatening the core of their economies. For instance, in November, President Trump warned that the “airspace above and surrounding Venezuela should be considered closed in its entirety”, prompting the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to issue alerts to airlines operating in the area. Any further escalation would likely exacerbate aviation disruptions and intensify concerns about travel to the wider region.
Critical minerals: The new frontier(s)
Economic stability and national security are now tightly linked to states’ ability to access critical minerals, required to support the energy transition, boost military-industrial development and economic growth, and secure geopolitical influence. Minerals like lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths are central to batteries, advanced electronics and precision weapons systems, giving governments strong incentives to secure both raw materials and refining capacity. Competition has been particularly pronounced between the US and China, over access to key supply chains, where China dominates processing and refining capacity for many of these minerals, including much of the world’s graphite, cobalt and rare earths. Both powers increasingly frame critical minerals policy in national security terms, treating control over extraction and processing as strategic leverage in their broader rivalry.
To achieve this, both countries have leveraged economic tools such as tariffs and export controls to protect domestic industries and gain bargaining power in this space. In 2025, for example, China introduced two waves of export controls on several rare earth elements, including samarium and gadolinium, stating that exports to foreign countries have undermined its national security. The US is also taking a proactive approach to securing access to critical supply chains and strategic minerals. For example, in December 2025 it signed the Pax Silica declaration with Australia, Israel, Japan, Singapore and South Korea to offset China’s control of the sector by boosting cooperation in the areas of logistics, processing and advanced manufacturing. Europe, meanwhile, has adopted its own critical raw materials strategy and is increasingly seeking to diversify imports by deepening cooperation with “like-minded” resource-rich partners, expanding European extraction, and strengthening supply-chain resilience through measures such as stockpiling.
Outlook
Deposit-rich countries with significant untapped potential face both opportunities and challenges as they look to boost foreign investment in critical minerals. Many sought after deposits are located in already fragile or politically unstable states such as Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ukraine, where governance constraints and security risks complicate large scale projects. Bolivia, for example, holds some of the world’s largest lithium reserves, but in 2025 has seen growing civil unrest and opposition from civil society and local activist groups over mining contracts with Chinese and Russian investors. Critics argue the agreements lack transparency and risk causing significant environmental damage. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s resource sector remains constrained by ongoing conflict, occupation of territory and infrastructure damage, limiting its ability to develop potential deposits and adding significant operational risk for investors. As this race intensifies, the impact on these countries – including intensified anti-mining sentiment, resource nationalism and fighting among state and non-state actors over supply chains – could aggravate existing instability, increasing political, security, and operational concerns for commercial operators
