Civil unrest
Cuba
In March 2026, protests took place across Cuba in response to escalating food costs, medicine shortages and power cuts, deepened by a US-imposed oil blockade following President Donald Trump’s January 2026 executive order, which imposes tariffs on countries selling or providing oil to Cuba. The blockade has severely impacted public service delivery, healthcare, education and transport. Many protests involved vandalism and clashes with security forces as the regime cracked down on unrest. Protesters ransacked offices of the ruling Communist Party in Morón, while in Havana, demonstrators targeted government buildings and the University of Havana, and blockaded roads with bonfires. While negotiations are reportedly taking place between US and Cuban authorities, it remains possible that dissatisfaction among US counterparts could not only intensify sanctions and further strain Cuban living conditions, but escalate into military action such as targeted strikes or leadership capture as seen in Venezuela.
Terrorism
US
On 7 March, police arrested two individuals with alleged Islamic State (IS) sympathies during an attempt to detonate improvised explosives at a protest by far-right activists, held outside the residence of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. An explosive device was thrown at the mayor’s residence, but failed to detonate, and authorities also reported discovering an explosive device in a vehicle linked to the suspects in Manhattan’s Upper East Side. As the November 2026 mid-term elections approach, political polarisation – and the US’s continued engagement in the Iran war – will sustain an elevated threat of extremist incidents, particularly against political figures, government buildings and places of worship.
War
Libya
In February 2026, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) granted new oil exploration and production rights to several foreign energy firms in the first bidding round held since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. This opening of Libya’s most critical industry has prompted renewed interest in the sector following years of investor caution after Gaddafi’s overthrow, and the instability that followed. However, political and security tensions in Libya remain high; persistent disputes over the Central Bank and the distribution of oil revenue between rival political factions and other stakeholders sustain the threat of operational disruptions at key oil fields and export terminals, as militia groups aligned with major players remain capable of seizing facilities or disrupting production.
Terrorism
Sub-Saharan Africa
Islamist militant activity has intensified across the Sahel. In the first three months of 2026, hundreds of people have been killed in attacks carried out by Al Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). These groups have maintained a high cadence of attacks, including raids on villages, suicide bombings, assaults on military targets, and, in Mali, systematic attacks by JNIM on commercial trucking and fuel convoys. JNIM has also expanded its presence towards coastal West Africa, with Islamist militant-linked fatalities doubling in northern Togo and Benin since 2025. These groups’ exploitation of areas with weakened state institutions and a limited security presence will likely continue as they deepen operations in their strongholds, while increasing pressure on the northern regions of coastal states, including Benin and Togo.
Civil Unrest
Kenya
In February 2026, unionised workers at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) initiated a one-week strike to demand increased compensation and improved working conditions amid a protracted dispute with the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA). The strike ended after two days, with union representatives reaching an interim return-to-work agreement with the KCAA, but the temporary stoppage caused widespread travel and commercial disruptions due to JKIA’s status as a regional passenger and cargo transportation hub, including in neighbouring Tanzania. Persistent tensions between the KCAA and Kenyan Aviation Workers Union (KAWU) continue to challenge ongoing collective bargaining talks; in late March, KAWU representatives accused the KCAA of failing to meet the terms of their interim agreement and threatened further strike action, sustaining potential for further disruptions in the coming months.
War
Sudan
In the first quarter of 2026, clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued across Darfur and Kordofan. Kordofan remains the most contested region, forming the de facto frontier between RSF‑controlled western Sudan and SAF‑held territory to the east. The RSF has continued efforts to encircle and besiege El Obeid, the regional capital of North Kordofan, while the nearby cities of Bara and Dilling in North and South Kordofan have come under repeated attack, with Bara changing hands multiple times amid ongoing assaults. Neither side has shown interest in de‑escalating, and instability is likely to remain a characteristic feature of the security environment in Darfur and Kordofan.
War
Ukraine
In March 2026, Ukraine recorded its first territorial gains against Russia since 2023, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reporting that Ukrainian forces have reclaimed approximately 460 square kilometres since the start of the year. Zelenskyy and NATO officials highlight Russia’s heavy personnel losses as a key constraint, with recent estimates suggesting 20,000–25,000 Russian soldiers killed each month, and total casualties significantly higher, complicating efforts to build new forces. Russia’s recent loss of access to a US‑based satellite internet service that it had been using on the battlefield has created communications problems along parts of the front, disrupting the operation and coordination of attack and surveillance drones. While Russia’s personnel shortages and ongoing equipment losses are unlikely to be resolved in the coming months, it will still likely pursue a spring–summer offensive focused on Ukraine’s ‘Fortress Belt’ in eastern Donetsk Oblast, including the Kramatorsk–Slovyansk axis, which remains a critical defensive line for Kyiv.
Civil unrest
Czech Republic
On 21 March, hundreds of thousands of activists protested in Prague to denounce draft legislation that would require individuals, civil society organisations and media outlets with foreign funding or other external ties to register with authorities, or face heavy fines. The bill, advanced by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s coalition which includes far right and populist parties, has drawn opposition criticism for closely resembling Russia’s ‘foreign agent’ law, and for compromising democratic values in the Czech Republic. The government’s push to pass the law is likely to face sustained resistance, particularly in urban centres like Prague, which remains an opposition stronghold. Meanwhile, similar legislation has been promoted in Georgia, where it has sparked mass protests led by pro-European groups.
War
Pakistan/Afghanistan
On 27 February, Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, declared ‘open war’ with Afghanistan, hours after Pakistan launched airstrikes on Kabul and the Afghan provinces of Paktia and Kandahar in response to attacks on its border troops. This escalation comes amid rising militancy in Pakistan and growing tensions over Islamabad’s claims that the Taliban provides safe haven to extremist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). More than 1,000 people were reportedly killed in the first month of renewed hostilities, effectively ending a fragile ceasefire agreed in late 2025, which had already been repeatedly undermined by sporadic clashes. Despite calls from countries like China for a lasting ceasefire, relations between the two sides have further deteriorated, with potential for additional border clashes and Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan targets.
